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The Superlative Recession and Economic Policies 
John A. Tatom 
 
In late 2008 and early 2009, there has been a serious deterioration in the economic 
outlook of political leaders, the media and many economic analysts. The National Bureau 
of Economic Research, the widely regarded official arbiter of business cycle dates, 
announced on December 1, 2008 that the economy had peaked or entered a recession in 
December 2007. Subsequently, comparisons of recent performance and the outlook have 
degenerated into comparisons with the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggesting that the 
current recession is the worst since the 1930s. This recession should be called the 
superlative recession because discussions invariably refer to the most dismal performance 
since the Great Depression: the decline in stock prices is the worst, the decline in 
employment is the worst, the fall in output is the worst, the rise in the unemployment rate 
is the worst, the banking system crisis is the worst, or any number of other “worsts” since 
the depression. 
 
These superlative comparisons are far off base.  But more importantly, the superlatives 
seem to have succeeded in reversing 70 years of history on economic policy and 
economic thought. Policymakers suddenly have rediscovered policy responses from the 
depression and advocated, after the fact, by so-called Keynesian economists, followers of 
British economist John Maynard Keynes. With the benefit of time, depression era 
policies had been seen as complete failures that extended and worsened the depression 
(see Shlaes 2008, for example). A long delayed monetary policy easing has offered new 
possibilities for an end to the deepening recession, but its continuation remains in doubt 
because it is the result of a shift in policy procedures more than of a shift in policy. More 
troublesome is that massive fiscal policy programs have become central to the policy 
debate, despite three large failed fiscal responses over the past year and a strong 
consensus in the policy community that such efforts are not likely to be effective. A 
change of leadership has focused efforts on increasing federal spending in ways and to an 
extent not seen in many years.       
 
 
Unemployment  
The recent run-up in the unemployment rate pales in comparison with earlier recessions. 
There have been ten earlier recessions since the end of World War II and eight of them 
did not last as long as the current one has.  So far, this is one of the longer recessions 
since the Great Depression.  The two post-war recessions that lasted longer were from 
November 1973 to March 1975 and from July 1981 to November 1982, both 16 months 
in length.  For the current recession to last longer, it would have to end in May 2009 or 
after. Some forecasts indicate that this is likely, while others do not.  It is possible that 
this recession could be the longest since the Great Depression, but the comparison would 
likely be very weak because that recession lasted 43 months, from August 1929 to March 
1933, and had incomparable consequences.  .   
 
In December 2008, the unemployment rate hit 7.2 percent, up 2.3 percentage points over 
the previous year. This is the highest rate since the 7.3 percent registered in December 
1993, not some time in the 1930s. The outlook, again according to the media and many 
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pundits, is that it would move far higher, to 9 percent, 10 percent or even more, by the 
end of 2009 and perhaps still rising into 2010.  Before jumping to the future, however, it 
is useful to look at the past.  In January 1993, the last time the unemployment rate was so 
high, a new administration entered office and proposed massive stimulus as part of 
“Rebuild America” program that called for increased infrastructure spending. A key 
difference is that by January 1993, the unemployment rate was falling, having peaked at 
7.8 percent in June 1992. 
 
In the 1973-75 recession, the unemployment rate at the business cycle peak was nearly 
the same as recently. In November 1973, the unemployment rate was 4.8 percent, about 
the same as the 4.9 percent in December 2007.  In 1973-75, the unemployment rate rose 
1.8 percentage points in the first 12 months of the recession, somewhat less than recently; 
for the full 16 month period, it rose 4.2 percentage points, far more than we have seen so 
far in the current recession. Moreover, the peak in the unemployment rate did not come at 
the end of the recession in March 1975, but instead it continued to rise for another two 
months, peaking at 9.0 percent in May 1975, 4.2 percentage points higher than at the 
business cycle peak. 
 
In the 1981-82 recession, the unemployment rate rose more in its first 12 months than 
recently. From the peak in July 1981, when the unemployment rate was already 7.2 
percent, the rate rose 2.6 percentage points to 9.8 percent a year later. By the trough of 
the recession, the unemployment rate had risen 3.6 percent points to 10.8 percent.  To 
exceed this rise, the unemployment rate would have to reach 8.5 percent by its end, 
which, again, some forecasts suggest may occur, while others do not. 
 
In the ten previous recessions, the worst 12-month increase in the unemployment rate had 
an average of 2.8 percentage points, higher than the 2.3 percentage point rise in the first 
12 months of this recession. Indeed, in only four of those recessions was the worst 12-
month rise smaller than in the current one and in six of them the rise in the 
unemployment rate was larger. The extent of the current recession, at least as gauged by 
this indicator, is relatively mild. After its first year, at least, the current recession is not 
longer than two of the past ten recessions and it is a small fraction of the length of the 
depression. Moreover, it has not produced outsized unemployment increases in its first 
year, compared with the worst two postwar recessions, somewhat worse than in one and 
somewhat better than in the other. If the unemployment rate rises to 9.2 percent or more 
before it ends, it would be worse than in any postwar recession, but not rival in any 
meaningful or comparable sense the 25 percent peak in unemployment during the Great 
Depression.  
 
Chart 1 shows the growth rates of payroll and civilian employment for 12-month periods 
since 1948.  In most of the previous recessions, indicated at the successive low points in 
the chart, employment growth rates were lower than so far in the current recession. This 
matches the experience with the changes in the unemployment rate noted above. Six of 
the previous ten recessions had larger rates of decline over some 12-month period than in 
the first 12 months of the current recession, even though only two of them lasted that 
long. 
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Many pundits point to a 2.6 million decline in payroll employment over the 12 months 
ending in December 2008 as a sign of the superlative recession. In 40 of the 720 quarters 
since 1948, however, there were larger 12-month percentage declines in payroll 
employment than in the recent year.  That is, the recent decline was exceeded in more 
than 5 percent of the possible observations and in more than 25 percent of all the periods 
when employment has declined for a one-year period.  This is not an unusually large 
decline for a recession. 
 
 
Chart 1 
Recent employment growth has been similar to the previous ten cyclical low points 
Payroll and civilian employment growth
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
The main indicator of recession is real GDP, the measure of the output of the nation’s 
goods and services, though unemployment developments are the more important 
indicator of the social losses of recession.  Real GDP has only recently begun to decline 
in this recession. Until the third quarter of 2008, real GDP was higher than it was at the 
cyclical peak in the fourth quarter of 2007. With the 3.8 percent rate of decline in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, real GDP was down by only 0.2 percent over the first four 
quarters of the recession, a relatively weak recession. After one year, real GDP is usually 
down by more than that. A further 5 percent rate of decline in the first quarter of 2009 
would leave real GDP down only 1.5 percent over the five quarters of recession, smaller 
than in both the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions. To exceed the decline in those two five-
quarter recessions, real GDP would have to decline about 11 percent at an annual rate in 
the first quarter of 2009, almost three times as fast as the decline in the last quarter of 
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2008 and a faster pace of decline than any recorded since 1947. Should such a record 
decline occur, real GDP would be down 3.1 percent over the five quarters, just edging out 
the 1973-75 experience as the worst since the Great Depression. 
 
Chart 2 shows real GDP growth on a year-over-year basis since 1948. In five of the ten 
past recessions, real GDP declined for a year by more than 2 percent and in two others it 
declined by more than one percent.  The 0.2 percent decline for four quarters registered in 
the last quarter of 2008 is smaller than in eight of the last ten recessions.   
 
For the worst two post-war recessions, the declines over the five quarters were 3.1 
percent in 1974-75 and 2.6 percent in 1981-82. To reach a decline of 3.1 percent or more, 
surpassing all postwar recessions in five quarters, real GDP would have to decline by 
11.1 percent in the first quarter of 2009. This would be remarkable, since real GDP has 
not declined at such a pace in any quarter in the postwar era. Of course a longer recession 
that included some historically record levels could extend the current recession into 
record breaking territory, but so far this does not appear likely unless economic activity 
deteriorates far beyond a simple extrapolation of the fourth quarter 2008 performance for 
two or three more quarters.    
 
Chart 2 
Real GDP has just begun to decline  
Real GDP growth has been positive recently, despite the recession
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; latest observation is IV/2008  
 
Should the worst postwar recession occur, however, it would not be too surprising. Tatom 
(2008a) shows that the energy price shock in the first half of 2008 was far and away the 
largest since World War II and perhaps ever in U.S. history. The worst two recessions in 
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postwar history were associated with huge energy prices shocks as well, but they were 
not subsequently reversed in the same way as the 2008 shock. Nor were they associated 
with such a large shock to the growth rate of monetary measures as occurred with the 
tight monetary policy from 1996 to the third quarter of 2008. Fortunately, this shock has 
also reversed sharply, suggesting that an economic recovery may have been set in motion 
already. In any event, comparisons to the Great Depression are over the top.  According 
to annual data prepared by Robert Gordon, over the four years from 1929 to 1933, real 
GDP fell 45.2 percent, or at a 14.1 percent annual rate!       
 
The flawed responses 
Monetary policy 
The Federal Reserve (Fed) expanded the monetary base and Federal Reserve Credit 
dramatically in September 2008, following two years of progressively slower monetary 
and total credit expansion. These moves suggested a change in policy that would bring on 
a recovery in economic activity.  But these changes may not continue because there has 
been no major shift in policy yet, only a change in procedures.  Chairman Bernanke 
(2009) recently clarified monetary policy in a major speech in London.  He indicated that 
the Fed had not shifted to so-called “quantitative easing,” which is a new euphemism for 
expanding the monetary base and monetary aggregates in a low interest rate environment.  
Instead, the Fed continues to pursue “credit easing” aimed at supplying credit to selected 
private sectors.   
 
Chart 3  
The Fed finally expanded the monetary base sharply in recent months  
Two stages of the Fed's credit easing: private credit, then both private and Fed credit
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Until September 2008, the Fed focused on increasing its supply of credit to the private 
sector, sterilizing it by selling government securities to keep Fed credit and the monetary 
base unchanged. Since then a change in policy procedures has continued rapid growth in 
private credit and, at least in September to December 2008, even larger increases in total 
Fed credit and the monetary base (see chart 3).1  
 
It is likely that the explosive growth in the monetary base will be sufficient to stimulate a 
recovery in economic activity.  With a closer Fed focus on credit, however, this is could 
become more difficult in the near future if the surge in monetary stimulus is allowed to 
go away or reverse.   
 
More fiscal stimulus 
A new round of fiscal policy stimulus has taken center stage in policy discussions, 
perhaps because of the widely-accepted, but false, notion that monetary policy became 
impotent when the the Fed lowered the federal funds rate target to a zero-to-0.25-percent 
range on December 16, 2008. The general outlines of the policy were presented in a 
speech by then President-elect Obama on January 8, 2009.  Early estimates placed the 
cost of the bill at $750 billion over two years, but the initial House of Representatives 
version totaled $825 billion and was passed in the House on January 28, 2009.  This bill 
includes about $275 billion in tax cuts and about $550 billion in new spending.   
 
There has been a major swing back to Keynesian fiscal policy ideas in the U.S. and 
elsewhere and not because of new evidence that it has become more effective or timely 
than in the past.  Instead, the shift appears motivated by two forces: fear that failure to 
enact a massive bill will damage public confidence and, second, a desire to pull all of the 
social spending plans of a new administration into one large front-loaded program, 
independent of the stimulative effects of any particular components of spending on 
overall spending on goods and services or on total employment. This is unfortunate given 
the massive spending programs of the past year that have proven to be ineffective in 
stimulating spending, largely by design and for long-known reasons.  These include the 
tax cut program passed in spring 2008 ($168 billion), the housing refinancing and 
stimulus program ($300 billion), and the bank bailout program passed in September 2008 
($700 billion).   
 
Economists sometimes discuss the effects of spending on the aggregate demand for goods 
and services or real GDP in terms of “the spending multiplier,” especially in the most 
elementary textbooks and around the halls of governments. For example, they might 
evaluate spending and tax multipliers to assess whether spending or tax changes affect 
aggregate demand or to compare the relative size of their effects. The spending multiplier 
indicates how much real GDP would be expected to rise per one dollar rise in spending. 
Policymakers also like to discuss employment multipliers: how much total employment 
rises per dollar rise in government expenditures. Forty years ago (November 1968), 
Andersen and Jordan produced one of the most provocative tests of monetary and fiscal 
policy effectiveness ever published.  They found that fiscal spending has no effect on 
                                                 
1 The monetary base is the Board of Governors’ series on a monthly, seasonally adjusted basis; the other 
three series are monthly averages of not-seasonally-adjusted weekly data based on the Fed’s weekly H.4.1 
data on “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances.”   
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GDP beyond a few quarters. This implies that the multiplier after one year is zero, so that 
the new government spending is fully offset by reduced private spending. In short, fiscal 
spending policy is impotent within a short time. 
 
Mankiw (2008), following a more Keynesian modeling tradition, argues that the spending 
multiplier is one, so that government spending has no effect on private sector spending 
and the effect on GDP is simply due to the larger government component of spending. He 
suggests that a consensus estimate is a multiplier of 1.4, so that each dollar of 
government spending would raise the government component by one dollar and boost 
private sector spending by another $0.4. Some proponents of road building believe that 
such spending can have a multiplier closer to 3, a classic mix of bad economics, bad 
measurement and political exploitation of admittedly simplistic pedagogy from 
elementary textbooks.  Mankiw (2008) also notes work by the new Chair of the 
President’s Council of Economics Advisers, Christina Romer, and David Romer (2007), 
showing that the tax multiplier is much larger, so that a tax cut of a given size is a much 
more effective stimulus than the same size government spending increase. 
 
Robert Barro (2009) has long argued that government spending has an average multiplier 
of zero in peacetime years, though he finds some evidence that in wartime the spending 
multiplier could be as large as 0.8, because not all of the new military spending is offset 
by reduced private sector spending. Woodford and Hall (2009) indicate that the wartime 
spending multiplier is one, similar to Barro’s result.  The current wartime experience 
does not compare with the two world wars or the Korean war, in terms of the risks to 
wealth and permanent income or in terms of the size of the boost in military spending. In 
this decade, there was a war-related surge in federal spending of less than one percent of 
GDP several years ago, hardly comparable to the surge, for example in World War II. At 
that time, federal outlays rose from 9.4 percent of GDP on average in 1935-40 to 12 
percent in 1941, 24.3 percent in 1942 and 43.6 percent in 1943 and 1944. Even the new 
proposal for spending, $550 billion over two years (less than 2 percent of GDP on 
average per year), is trivial in comparison to those earlier wartime surges in spending. 
The important point is not the relative size of the spending increase, however, it is the 
absence of a threat to permanent income such as that posed by the world wars.      
 
Tatom (1991) uses a private sector production function to assess whether government 
infrastructure capital formation (non-defense) boosts private sector productivity and 
output and finds that there is no effect.  This might suggest that public sector 
infrastructure spending has a multiplier of one, or that real GDP rises only by the amount 
of the government spending, as suggested by Woodward and Hall. However, David Alan 
Aschauer (1989) shows that private sector investment spending declines dollar-for-dollar 
with an increase in public sector spending.  Two implications of this are that private 
sector output is reduced due to the decline in the private sector capital that occurs when 
public sector capital increases, so that real GDP is unaffected by public infrastructure 
spending or the spending multiplier is zero. The former effect is referred to as “direct 
crowding out” as the rate of return to private sector capital formation is diminished by an 
increase in public sector capital formation. The implications of this research are that 
government spending usually is not effective in stimulating aggregate demand and 
boosting total employment.  Output and employment are simply moved around from the 
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private to the public sector, with no effect, or perhaps negative effects, on the overall 
productivity of the nation’s resources. Gramlich (1994) provides a summary of the debate 
over infrastructure spending, though he is more sanguine, like Aschauer, about the 
productivity enhancing effects of infrastructure spending.   
 
The consensus of economists, at least until recently, is that fiscal spending policy is weak 
at best and usually too poorly timed to be useful for short-term effects on economic 
policy, but that tax cuts, again suffering from poor timing usually, can be effective when 
they are permanent or provide immediate incentives for spending, such as an investment 
tax credit.  Fortunately monetary policy is very powerful and does not suffer from the 
implementation lag that fiscal policy does. The current spending package and tax cuts 
suffer from the worst problems of fiscal policy.  The spending increases focus on a 
collection of infrastructure spending and other programs that are chosen for political 
reasons and not for their potential effects on output and employment. Even the best 
efforts would not have much or any effect, however, since government spending has a 
weak track record as a fiscal stimulus policy.  Some analysts have suggested other 
policies that would likely work, if they could be implemented in a timely way.  One is a 
proposal by Susan Woodford and Robert Hall that temporary state sales tax elimination, 
financed by federal transfer payments to states, would provide strong incentive to boost 
private sector spending quickly. Like an investment tax credit or any other temporary 
spending subsidy, it would only be available for spenders and only for the immediate 
future when the spending is desired, unlike an income or wage tax cut that provides no 
direct incentive to spend, especially if temporary.  Unfortunately, as noted, there are few 
incentives to spend in the recovery and reinvestment plan. Part of the business tax cut is 
only available for businesses that do more investment spending and some spending 
programs are contingent on new spending before a future deadline, so that the incentive is 
to spend now and not later. Getting the spending going apparently will require more than 
this, however.  The Congressional Budge Office (2009) estimates that the roll out of the 
new spending will be too slow to have much effect in 2009, even if one assumes that it 
can be effective in stimulating aggregate demand.   
 
Unfortunately, policymakers are ignoring evidence on what works and what doesn’t.  
They are also ignoring the negative effects that booming spending is having on financial 
markets and fears of future taxes. There is also mighty risk of damage to the new 
Administration’s plans.  The last major initiative to “Rebuild America” was at the 
beginning of the Clinton Administration when the unemployment rate was about the 
same as in December. That program failed to pass because of similar questions about its 
necessity and effectiveness; its failure to pass was also a major setback for the rest of the 
Clinton Administration’s plans and first term.   
 
Most political pundits suggest that the Obama Administration’s spending and tax plan 
will pass, perhaps with major modifications.  In the best case scenario, seldom-mentioned 
monetary policy may provide the stimulus that many newly minted Keynesians believe 
will come from fiscal stimulus.        
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